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Labor markets across the world are usually characterized by a
set of institutions that limit the ability of private agents to determine
wages and the amount of labor required and by tax systems that trans-
fer resources from the working to the nonworking population via
unemployment benefits, employment protection laws, and active em-
ployment policies by the government (Saint-Paul, 1999).
One strand of the economic analysis claims that labor institu-
tions reduce the rate of job creation and increases unemployment
(Salvanes, 1997; Nickell, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). This
process has an adverse impact on economic growth (Besley and Bur-
gess, 2004; Forteza and Rama, 2002). Supporters of this approach
usually suggest the reduction or elimination of labor market regula-
tions in order to foster labor reallocation and increased competition,
which in turn enhances growth (Burki and Perry, 1997). Labor mar-
ket reforms, however, have proved to be politically unfeasible and
have faced significant opposition from powerful sectors of the economy
(Alesina and Drazen, 1991).
A second strand of the analysis holds that the behavior of labor
markets is far from competitive (Freeman, 1993a; Blanchard, in this
volume). Proponents suggest that in the presence of market failures,
governments should set up regulations for the proper functioning of
the labor markets. Labor market regulations are introduced to enhance
the welfare of workers and insure them from unexpected shocks. For
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example, legislation on social security and mandated benefits was
designed to secure the workers’ income in case of old age, sickness,
disability, and work-related accidents. Job security provisions are simi-
larly undertaken to insure an income for workers who lose their jobs
during economic downturns (Heckman and Pagés, 2000).
This paper tests whether labor market regulations have been an
obstacle to long-run growth. Using two recently developed databases
on labor regulation by Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and
others (2003), we perform our regression analysis for a sample of
seventy-six countries over the period 1970–2000 in the tradition of
empirical growth literature (Barro, 1991, 1997). Our analysis is per-
formed on both cross-sectional and panel data; in both cases we con-
trol for the likely endogenous regressors. Our set of instruments
consists of both external instruments chosen from theories of selec-
tion of labor regulations (Djankov and others, 2003a) and internal
instruments, which are lagged levels or differences in panel data mod-
els (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995).
Our cross-sectional results indicate that growth in industrial coun-
tries is hampered by thicker labor codes. The effect of de facto labor
regulations on growth is mixed, depending on the data, indicator, or
sample used. Finally, regulations stipulated in labor laws regarding
employment, industrial relations, and social security seem to have
an impact on growth only for industrial economies.
Our panel data regression analysis yielded five main results. First,
growth among developing countries could be fostered by reducing the
regulations stipulated in the national labor codes. However, deregu-
lation processes in labor markets commonly succeed at reducing the
number of regulations in labor laws, but they cannot improve the
strength of legal enforcement mechanisms.
Second, growth in industrial countries could be enhanced by lower
de facto regulation. According to our estimates, a one-standard-de-
viation decline in the labor regulations index could generate a 2 per-
cent increase in growth in advanced economies. Achieving these
growth effects would require an enormous deregulation effort from
this group countries—especially the European economies. Unfortu-
nately, most European countries have only marginally changed their
labor institutions (Siebert, 1997).
Third, a decline in the degree of de facto labor regulation may also
improve the growth rate of developing countries. Our regression re-
sults suggest that growth in developing countries would increase by
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in the de facto labor regulations. However, obtaining significant growth
benefits in these nations would require substantial labor market re-
form (that is, a sharper decline in labor regulations than that seen in
the data over the period of analysis).
Fourth, the transmission channels of the adverse growth effects
of higher labor regulations within developing countries are minimum
wages and trade unions. Again, we find that the growth effects ob-
tained from one-standard-deviation reductions in both variables are
not plausible unless the countries embark on serious efforts to de-
regulate labor markets.
Finally, we construct a scorecard that summarizes the different
panel estimation results presented in this paper. Our most robust
results are that thicker codes are negatively associated with growth
for the full sample and for developing countries; de facto regulations
seem to hinder growth among developing countries; and minimum
wages have an adverse impact on growth.
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. Section 1 pre-
sents a brief review of labor regulations and economic performance.
Section 2 discusses the data used and the methodology applied. Sec-
tion 3 empirically evaluates whether labor regulations have hindered
long-term growth. Finally, section 4 concludes.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a vast empirical literature evaluating the effects of eco-
nomic policy on growth for a cross-section of countries. Recent evi-
dence indicates that government interventions may have an important
effect on growth. Hall and Jones (1999) show that poor social infra-
structure (which they approximate by poor contract enforcement, low
bureaucratic quality, and government repudiation of contracts, among
others) is negatively related to long-term growth. The degree and
type of government intervention vary across countries. Djankov and
others (2002) analyze the regulations on starting a business across
countries; they find that countries with extensive regulations on en-
try may enlarge their informal sectors and, hence, have a poor eco-
nomic performance.1
1. Djankov and associates argue that this empirical result is consistent with
economic regulations legislated and imposed by government officials or insiders
that extract rents (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).170 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
In policy circles, the differing viewpoints on the role of labor mar-
ket regulations in the economic process fall into two broad groups
(Freeman, 1993a). On the one hand, the distortionist view argues
that government regulations in labor markets (in the form of mini-
mum wages, social security contributions, job security, and collective
bargaining) create distortions in an optimal world (World Bank, 1990).
According to this view, labor market regulations are major obstacles
to growth and employment for three main reasons. First, labor mar-
ket regulations prevent wages from equaling their marginal product
in equilibrium and thus lead to the misallocation of resources. Sec-
ond, regulations may hinder the adjustment of labor markets to eco-
nomic shocks. Finally, labor regulations that redistribute economic
rents from capital to labor may reduce the profitability of investment;
examples include collective bargaining schemes and expansionary fiscal
programs to fund public employment. This reduced profitability may
discourage investment and lower growth.2
On the other hand, the institutionalist view claims that market
failures generate divergences from the ideal world and emphasizes
the benefits of government interventions in the labor markets (ILO,
1991). Labor regulations may fulfill redistributive roles to low-wage
workers or constitute an insurance against adverse market outcomes
(Standing and Tokman, 1991). Labor standards force employers to
focus on enhancing their labor force through either training or tech-
nical innovations (Freeman, 1993a, 1993b). Finally, standards on
mandated benefits may help solve moral hazard or selectivity issues
that prevent firms from offering socially desirable benefits or con-
tracts (Summers, 1988).
Forteza and Rama (2002) evaluate the role of labor market regu-
lations in the success of economic reforms. They find that wage ad-
justment and labor reallocation in outward-oriented economies will
be faster if labor markets are flexible. International competition in
the goods markets will drive down wages in the import-competing
sectors and labor costs in the economy, thus making the export sec-
tor more competitive. If labor markets are not flexible, the adjust-
ment in the economy will be slower and the unemployment rate will
2. Freeman (1993a, 1993b) argues that the distortionist view is not consistent
with macro- and microeconomic propositions derived from economic theory. For
example, Ricardian equivalence is rejected by those who argue that social security
contributions have a negative impact on investment and savings. Also, the Coase
theorem is not taken into account when distortionists claim that employment
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be higher (Rama, 1997). Furthermore, current labor laws have been an
obstacle to absorbing workers displaced by economic reform (IDB, 1997).
The usual recommendation, therefore, is to eliminate government in-
terventions that make labor costly and risky (Burki and Perry, 1997).
Potential losers from economic reforms, such as workers in the
public sector or unionized labor, usually try to hinder or delay the
economic adjustment process (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Fernandez
and Rodrik, 1991). High resistance to economic reforms from well-
organized groups may lead to generalized protests and strikes. In
response, the government may delay the adoption of reforms or launch
an insufficient package of reforms, which, in turn, would have an
insignificant impact on economic performance. This leads to the ar-
gument that resistance to reforms will be weaker when the distribu-
tion of adjustment costs is relatively equal and that economic reforms
should be complemented with compensation mechanisms for work-
ers affected by the reforms, such as job separation packages, early
retirement programs, and unemployment benefits (Rama, 1995;
Forteza and Rama, 2002).
Forteza and Rama (2002) find that labor regulations that deter-
mine the success or failure of structural reforms work through more
political channels _proxied by unionization and government_ , which
are correlated with deeper recessions before adjustment and slower re-
coveries in the aftermath. On the other hand, economic aspects _mea-
sured by minimum wages or mandated benefits_ do not seem to hinder
growth. Finally, Besley and Burgess (2004) assess the role of labor mar-
ket regulations in explaining the performance of the Indian manufac-
turing industry between 1958 and 1992. They find that regulations to
protect workers (in the areas of collective bargaining and labor dis-
putes) actually reduced growth and increased poverty.
2. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In this section, we discuss the labor regulation data used in our
regression analysis and the estimation strategy pursued. First, we de-
scribe two recently developed databases on labor regulations and out-
comes: the aggregate and individual measures proposed by Rama (1995)
and Rama and Artecona (2002); and the indicators of labor market regu-
lations gathered from labor codes by Djankov and others (2003a).
Second, we outline the estimation techniques used to test the impact
of labor regulations on long-term growth. Our preferred estimation172 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
technique is the generalized method of moments instrumental vari-
ables (GMM-IV) system estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1998), which takes into account the unobserved country-
and time-specific effects, as well as possible endogenous regressors, in
a dynamic panel data model.
2.1 The Data
As mentioned above, we use two different databases on labor market
regulation and outcomes. The Rama-Artecona database has information
on a larger sample of countries (121), it has a panel dimension (five-year
average observations spanning 1945 to 1999), and it allows us to distin-
guish between regulations on paper and in practice.3 The database from
Djankov and others (2003a), which we denote the Djankov-La Porta
database, covers a smaller sample of countries (eighty-five) and contains
only cross-sectional information. It specifically gathers information on
three types of labor laws (employment, industrial relations, and social
security) for the year 1997. Next, we further describe the main features
of these databases.
The Rama-Artecona Database
Rama and Artecona (2002) have collected extensive information on
labor market regulations and outcomes for 121 countries. They report
the data in five-year-period averages from 1945–49 to 1995–99. In this
database, we can distinguish between regulations on paper (or de jure
regulations) and regulations in practice (or de facto regulations). De
jure regulations are approximated by eight indicators of International
Labor Organization (ILO) labor standards as ratified and stipulated by
legal documents in several countries. These conventions contemplate
universal legislation on issues such as child labor, compulsory labor,
equal remuneration for male and female workers, equal opportunity,
the right of collective bargaining, and organization in unions. De facto
regulations and labor market outcomes are approximated by thirty-six
indicators classified into six categories: labor force; employment and
unemployment; wages and productivity; work conditions and benefits;
trade unions and collective bargaining; and public sector employment.
3. See appendix A for the list of countries.Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 173
Here Rama and Artecona provide information on labor market
regulations such as minimum wages, mandated benefits, nonwage
costs, collective bargaining, and public employment, as well as labor
market outcomes such as labor force, unemployment, earnings, and
productivity.
Distinguishing between de jure and de facto regulations is crucial
given that the enforcement of regulations and norms stipulated in
labor codes is quite limited in developing countries.4 We thus follow
Rama (1995) and Forteza and Rama (2002) in defining aggregate indi-
ces of the overall extent of labor regulations in the economy. Our
index of de jure regulation, which we denote L0, is measured as the
cumulative number of ILO conventions ratified by a country’s labor
code over time. This index reflects not only the ideal regulatory frame-
work from an institutionalist point of view (Freeman, 1993a), but
also the thickness of national labor codes (Rama and Forteza, 2002).
The index includes the ratification of the ILO conventions on the
minimum age of employment (convention 138), forced or compulsory
labor (convention 29), the abolition of forced labor (convention 105),
equal remuneration for male and female workers (convention 100),
discrimination with regard to equality of opportunity or conditions of
employment on the basis of race, religion, sex, political opinion, or
social origin (convention 111), the right of workers and employers to
establish associations or organizations of their own (convention 87),
and the right to bargain collectively (convention 98).
As mentioned, however, the extent of regulation in the labor mar-
ket depends on the way these legal regulations are implemented and
enforced. Therefore, we require an indicator that captures the degree
of enforcement as opposed to the number of regulations. Rama and
Artecona (2002) provide measures for regulations in the following four
areas: minimum wages, mandated benefits, trade unions, and public
sector employment. Unfortunately, no data are available on job sepa-
ration costs for a large number of countries.5 To evaluate the overall
effect of labor reforms in these dimensions, we follow Rama (1995) and
Forteza and Rama (2002) in constructing two aggregate indices of
4. Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1997) suggest that de jure regulations
that appear to be more distortionary in developing countries could be the least
enforced in practice.
5. Heckman and Pagés (2000) construct data on job separation costs for Latin
America and find that these costs have a substantial impact on the level of em-
ployment in the region.174 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
de facto labor regulations. Both proposed indices include proxies for
these four dimensions of labor regulations, as summarized in table 1.6
Both aggregate indices, L1 and L2, are the simple averages of the
proxies in the four dimensions. We normalized all the labor regula-
tion indicators so that these variables are comparable across coun-
tries. Specifically, their values fluctuate between 0 and 1, with higher
values reflecting a higher degree of labor market regulation. Finally,
the aggregate indices, L1 and L2, are computed for countries with
information for at least two of the four dimensions of the analysis.
The Djankov-La Porta Database
Djankov and others (2003a) have collected data on labor regulation
in eighty-five countries. They analyze three dimensions of the national
labor codes: laws governing individual employment contracts (employ-
ment laws); laws regulating the adoption, bargaining, and enforcement
of collective agreements, the organization of trade unions, and the
industrial action by workers and employers (industrial and collective
relations law); and laws governing the social response to needs and
conditions that affect the quality of life, such as old age, disability,
death, unemployment, and maternity (social security law).7
6. The higher degree of correlation between the different dimensions of the
labor regulation index prevents us from including all the variables of the aggre-
gate index in the same regression.
7. In contrast with the Rama-Artecona database, we only have cross-sectional
information on these variables.





Ratio of minimum wages to labor
costs per worker in the
manufacturing sector
Social security contributions as a
percentage of salaries
Total trade union membership as a
percentage of total labor force
Ratio of general government
employment to total employment
Ratio of minimum wages to income
per capita
Number of days of maternity leave
for a first child born without
complications
Dummy: Ratification of ILO
convention 87, which allows
workers to organize
Ratio of central government
employment to total employment
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We first use the aggregate index of employment laws, which regu-
late aspects of the individual labor contract, terms of reference, and
termination of the contract. This index covers the restrictions placed
on alternative employment contracts, conditions of the employment
contract, and job security. Next, we have the aggregate index of in-
dustrial relations laws, which protect workers from employers. These
laws contemplate aspects of the worker-employer relationship such
as collective bargaining, the participation of workers in management,
and collective disputes (for example, strikes and lockouts). Finally,
we have the aggregate index of social security laws covering the risk
of old age, sickness, and unemployment. Since labor laws (rather than
outcomes) are used to construct all these indices, they are closer in
spirit to de jure labor rigidities than de facto implementation in Rama
and Artecona (2002).
Growth and its Determinants
Our dependent variable is the growth rate of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita, and we obtain the data from the Penn World
Table 6.1 gathered by Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). Specifi-
cally, we use the real GDP per capita (chain index prices). We follow
the vast existing empirical growth literature in choosing the deter-
minants of long-run economic growth.8 We include the initial GDP
per capita (in logs) to test for transitional convergence. We also con-
sider structural factors such as the level of secondary schooling from
Barro and Lee (2000) as a proxy of human capital; credit to the pri-
vate sector as a ratio to GDP to measure financial depth (Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000); the ratio of real exports and im-
ports to GDP as a measure of trade openness; and the Freedom House
index of civil liberties as a proxy of governance. Data on the con-
sumer price index (CPI) inflation rate and real exchange rate over-
valuation are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators, which proxy for stabilization policies. Finally, changes in
the terms of trade (as a proxy for external shocks) are also taken from
World Development Indicators.
8. The set of growth determinants follows the classification of Loayza,
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2.2 The Empirical Framework
This subsection evaluates the role of labor market rigidities in
long-term growth following the traditional empirical growth litera-
ture. Our regression framework is specified by the following system:
According to the first equation of system 1, the equilibrium growth
rate of the economy in country i during the [t, t – k] period,           , is
a function of the log of per capita output in the initial period t – k,       ; a
set of growth determinants for country i at time t described by the
matrix Xit; and unobserved country- and period-specific effects, µi and
ηt, respectively. Our set of long-term growth determinants follows
the work of Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2003). The initial level
of per capita output (in logs) is included to test for conditional conver-
gence. We consider indicators of human capital, financial depth, trade
openness, and governance as proxies for structural policies and insti-
tutions. The CPI inflation rate and the real exchange rate overvalua-
tion are proxies for stabilization policies, and terms of trade shocks
approximate external shocks.9
In the spirit of Rama (1995), our second equation in the system
indicates that any deviation in long-term equilibrium growth may be
explained by a set of variables that proxy for departures from compe-
tition in the labor markets, Lit. This matrix, L, is our variable of inter-
est; it may comprise different indicators that focus on specific policy or
institutions in the labor markets, such as minimum wages, manda-
tory benefits, trade union membership, government employment, so-
cial security laws, and collective bargaining. We denote by
all the K indicators of labor market rigidities comprised in the ma-
trix, Lit. Unlike Rama (1995) and Forteza and Rama (2002), we do not
9. We follow the tradition of empirical cross-country and panel growth regres-
sion models in focusing on the ultimate policy, structural, and external determi-
nants of factor accumulation and productivity growth. Hence, we exclude capital
and any other direct factor of production.
*
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assume that labor market policies and institutions are time-invari-
ant, but rather expect that labor institutions may change over longer
horizons. If any of the        variables equals zero, labor markets are
perfectly competitive. In contrast, larger values for any of these vari-
ables indicates greater deviation from perfect competition in the la-
bor market. Negative values for the γ k coefficients in the Γ matrix
imply that the reduction of labor rigidities (that is, distortions that
cause labor markets to depart from competitive equilibrium) may
improve the growth rate in the long term.
Performing a regression analysis of equation (1) may raise additional
empirical problems. Some of the        variables are highly correlated with
each other, thus leading to problems of multicollinearity. For example,
the correlation between trade union membership and government em-
ployment is approximately 0.8, whereas mandated benefits and mini-
mum wages have a correlation of 0.5. This problem of collinearity impedes
the identification of the parameters of the Γ matrix.
We address the issues of collinearity among labor regulation
indicators by aggregating the variables in the Lit matrix, using the
same strategy as Rama (1995) and Forteza and Rama (2002). Before we
aggregate them in a single index, we need to normalize them so as to
express them in comparable units. We defined our labor market rigidity
indicator above as         , for k = 1,…, K. Next, we define        and
as the minimum and maximum deviations from perfect competition
that a country’s labor market can achieve. We can thus specify our
normalized labor market rigidity indicator as follows:
By construction, fluctuates between zero and one. We then define
our aggregate measure of labor market rigidities as the average of J
out of the K relevant labor market rigidities (where J ≤  K). In prin-
ciple, this aggregate index also ranges from zero to one, but unless
all of the labor market rigidities are perfectly correlated with each
other, the actual range of variation across countries should be sig-
nificantly narrower for the aggregate measures than for any of the
individual indicators.
We use our aggregate index of labor market rigidities,        , to test
the effects of the overall labor market rigidity on growth. We refor-
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The sign and order of γ A can be used to check the nature and
magnitude of the impact of labor rigidities on growth. However, dif-
ferent labor market rigidities may have consequences of a different
sign that cancel each other to some extent. Even if the estimate of
the parameter γ A turned out to be significant, its mere sign might not
help identify the specific policies and institutions that need to be re-
formulated. We still need more information on the sign and order of
magnitude of the γ j parameters.
We are tempted to use equation (2) to test for the effects of par-
ticular labor market rigidities. If      is replaced by in equation
(2), the coefficient multiplying it captures not only the effects of the
labor market regulation, k, but also (partly) those of all of the other
missing rigidities. Since they are likely to be correlated with each
other, the value obtained for γ k might be reflecting the effects of these
other rigidities. For example, let us assume that unionized labor does
not affect growth, but minimum wages do, and that minimum wages
tend to be higher in countries with larger labor unions (actually we
find a correlation of 0.5 between these variables). If we include mini-
mum wages in equation (2) instead of    , we obtain a significant
estimate for this variable even though it should be statistically and
economically irrelevant. This problem can be partially corrected by
defining the complementary labor regulation variable,      ,  as  the
average of the indicators that are different from k. This complemen-
tary variable can be used to control for all other labor market fea-
tures, apart from      , by using the following model:
with the coefficient γ k capturing the effect of labor market regulation
k on long-term growth.
2.3 Estimation Techniques
We first estimate the growth regression equation specified in equa-
tion (1) using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). We then run re-
gression again incorporating time dummies, given that we want to
analyze differences in growth experiences across countries stemming
from labor rigidities. Neither of these methods, however, controls for
endogenous regressors. Forces that affect both labor rigidities and
growth could be driving the correlation between the variables, and
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One way to tackle the problem of endogeneity is to instrument for
labor rigidities. We follow Djankov and others (2003a) in choosing the
appropriate instruments for our measures of labor institutions. Ac-
cording to these authors, three theories explain the choice of labor
institutions: efficiency theory, political power theory, and legal theory.
Of these, North (1981) considers that the choice of institutions is driven
primarily by efficiency considerations. Different institutional arrange-
ments (such as the reliance on market forces, contract and private
litigation, and government regulation) may be appropriate in different
circumstances. One version of efficiency theory focuses on the distinc-
tion between regulation and social insurance. Social insurance may be
relatively more efficient than regulation in dealing with market fail-
ures in countries with a low social marginal cost of tax revenues, which
presumably are the wealthy countries (Becker and Mulligan, 2000).
Poor countries must regulate to protect workers from being fired or
mistreated by employers, whereas rich countries provide unemploy-
ment insurance, sick leave, early retirement, and so on because they
can raise taxes cheaply to finance such operations (Blanchard, 2002). A
second version of efficiency theory argues the opposite. It holds that
the principal cost of regulation, relative to other forms of social control
of business, is its potential for abuse of regulated firms by the govern-
ment and its officials. Labor regulations can be used to force firms to
hire and keep excess labor, to empower unions friendly with the gov-
ernment, and so forth. Rich, well-governed countries thus have a com-
parative advantage at regulation relative to other forms of social control
of business because their governments are less likely to abuse power.
Political power theories argue that institutions are designed to trans-
fer resources from those out of political power to those in power and to
entrench those in political power (Olson, 1993). Institutions are gener-
ally designed to be inefficient by political leaders aiming to help them-
selves and their favored groups. Regulations protecting workers are
introduced by socialist, social-democratic, and generally leftist govern-
ments to benefit their political constituencies (Hicks, 1999). In addition,
labor regulations are a response to pressure from trade unions, and
they should thus be more extensive when unions are more powerful,
regardless of which government is in charge. Dictatorships, which are
less constrained than democratically elected governments, tend to have
more redistributive laws and institutions. Constitutions, legislative con-
straints, and other forms of checks and balances are all conducive to
fewer regulations (Djankov and others, 2002). Likewise, economies that
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expensive regulations, because competition makes it less lucrative for
governments to raise firms’ regulatory costs (Ades and Di Tella, 1999).
With regard to legal theory, Djankov and others (2003b) argue
that countries with different legal traditions use different social con-
trols of business. Common law countries tend to rely on markets and
contracts, civil law countries on regulation, and socialist countries
on state ownership.10 This implies that civil law countries and social-
ist law countries should regulate labor markets more extensively than
common law countries. Common law countries may also have a less
generous social security system since they rely on markets to pro-
vide insurance.
Our set of instruments for labor rigidity indicators is as follows.
We use the log of GDP per capita to control for efficiency purposes. To
test the political power theories, we use the index of institutionalized
autocracy from the Polity IV codebook (Marshall and Jaggers, 2003)
the leftist political orientation of the government and congress (Beck
and others, 2001), and measures of trade openness. Finally, we test
the legal theory by including dummy variables for countries with Brit-
ish common law and German civil code (La Porta and others, 1999).
Another way to tackle the endogeneity of labor rigidities is to use
the GMM estimators developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998). This technique takes account of unobserved
time effects through the inclusion of period-specific dummy variables,
while country-specific effects are dealt with via differencing, given
the dynamic nature of the regression. We also control for biases re-
sulting from simultaneous or reverse causation. A more detailed ref-
erence to the GMM-IV techniques is presented in appendix B.
10. Common law emerged in England and is mostly characterized by the impor-
tance of decisionmaking by juries, independent judges, and judicial discretion as
opposed to codes. Common law was transmitted to the British colonies, including
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, the United States, and a number
of countries in the Caribbean, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. Civil law evolved
from Roman law in Western Europe and was incorporated into civil codes in France
and Germany in the nineteenth century. It is characterized by less independent
judiciaries, the relative unimportance of juries, and a greater role of both substan-
tive and procedural codes as opposed to judicial discretion. French civil law was
transplanted throughout Western Europe, including Belgium, Holland, Italy, Por-
tugal, and Spain, and subsequently to the colonies in North and West Africa, Latin
America, and parts in Asia. German codes became accepted in Germanic Western
Europe, but were also transplanted to Japan and from there to China, Korea, and
Taiwan. Socialist law was adopted in countries that came under the influence of the
Soviet Union, while an indigenous Scandinavian legal tradition developed in Den-
mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (Djankov and others, 2003).Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 181
3. EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
In this section we empirically evaluate whether labor market regu-
lations have hindered long-term growth. We perform our regression
analysis, first, on a cross-section sample of seventy-six countries with
average figures for the 1970–2000 period and, second, on panel data for
the same sample of countries with five-year averages over the same
period. We use both the Rama-Artecona and Djankov-La Porta data-
bases for the cross-section and only the former for the panel analysis.
We begin by presenting some basic statistics on the extent of
labor market regulations and economic growth. We then perform a
cross-sectional and panel data correlation analysis between growth
and labor regulations. Next, we discuss the basic results of the growth
regression in the cross-section of countries, followed by the panel
data evidence on growth and labor regulations using different esti-
mation techniques. Finally, we present our scorecard on the growth
costs of labor regulations.
3.1 Basic Statistics
Table 2 reports the simple average of the growth rate in per capita
GDP and different indicators of labor market regulation for a cross-
section of countries during the 1970–2000 period. It includes both the
simple averages for the Rama Artecona indicators of labor rigidity and
the averages of the labor regulation indicators from the Djankov-La
Porta database.
Based on the Rama-Artecona de jure index, we find that industrial
countries are more regulated than developing countries (0.49 versus
0.25, respectively). Labor markets in Latin America are more regulated
than the world sample (0.34 versus 0.30), whereas East Asia is less regu-
lated than the world sample (0.09). Within the Latin American region,
Chile has a similar number of regulations to the regional average, while
Uruguay (not shown in the table) has the largest number of regulations
(0.67). Both the Rama-Artecona de facto indices (L1 and L2) indicate that
industrial countries exhibit a larger degree of labor market regulations
than developing countries. If we use the L2 index of de facto regulations,
Latin American labor markets are as regulated as labor markets in
industrial economies. Chilean labor markets are less regulated than the
Latin American average regardless of the aggregate index used.
The table also lists the components of the two aggregate indices
of de facto labor regulations. Minimum wages, for example, are higher182 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
(lower) among industrial countries than among developing
countries when they are normalized by industrial wages (per capita
income). Minimum wages in East Asia are below those in Latin Ameri-
can markets, with Argentina, Chile, and Peru achieving the lowest
minimum wages in the region (when normalized by per capita
income; again, only the case of Chile is shown in the table).
Full Industrial Developing East Latin
Variable  sample economies countries  Asia America Chile
GDP per capita growth (percent)
Labor market rigiditya
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0






Industrial (collective) relations law
Collective bargaining
Worker participation in management
Collective disputes
Social security laws
Old age, disability, and death benefits




























Table 2. Basic Statistics for Labor Market Regulations and
Economic Growth, 1970–2000
Simple averages across groups of countries
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003a).
a. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
c. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified
in the text.


































































































































0.73Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 183
In the case of mandated benefits, social security contributions (nor-
malized by total wages) are larger among industrial countries than
among developing countries (0.45 versus 0.35, respectively). Chile’s
social security contributions (0.40) are larger than the averages for
both the region (0.35) and East Asia (0.26). Industrial countries also
have longer maternity leave than developing countries, with Chile again
displaying a larger figure than the average in East Asia and Latin
America. Trade union membership in developed economies is almost
twice that in developing countries (0.39 versus 0.20, respectively). Trade
union membership is lower in Latin America and East Asia than the
mean for developing areas. The share of workers affiliated with trade
unions is lower in Chile than in the group of Latin American countries,
with Argentina and Brazil having the largest share of unionized work-
ers. Finally, the size of public sector employment is larger in advanced
economies than in developing countries; the difference is significantly
larger when we use the general government (0.39 versus 0.22, respec-
tively). Public employment in Chile is lower than average employment
in both Latin America and East Asia, with the largest public employ-
ment in Latin America displayed by Argentina and Uruguay.
Finally, the table presents the simple average of the Djankov-La
Porta indicators of labor regulation, which complement the measures
of de jure regulations in the Rama-Artecona database. Regarding
employment laws, developing countries are more regulated than in-
dustrial countries (1.60 versus 1.36), especially in the areas of job
security and conditions of employment. The Chilean labor market is
less regulated than the regional average (1.46 versus 1.79), as well as
in job security and employment conditions. Similarly, developing coun-
tries are slightly more regulated than industrial countries in the area
of industrial (collective) relations law (1.26 versus 1.22). Specifically,
they are more regulated in the areas of collective bargaining and
disputes and less regulated in the participation of workers in man-
agement. Argentina, Mexico, and Peru (not shown) have the most
highly regulated labor markets in Latin America in the area of collec-
tive bargaining, followed by Chile and Colombia. Finally, workers in
industrial countries are more protected with regard to social security
than are workers in developing countries (2.21 versus 1.53); the larg-
est difference is seen in unemployment benefits (0.78 versus 0.38).
Table 3 presents the evolution of labor regulations over the de-
cades spanning the 1970–2000 period for different subsamples of coun-
tries. The aggregate index of de jure rigidities, L0, increased over the
decades for all subgroups of countries. This implies that countries184 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
across the world ratified more ILO conventions over time. The ex-
tent of rigidities in practice decreased slightly among industrial coun-
tries in the 1990s relative to the 1980s, whereas it increased among
developing countries. Chilean labor markets became more regulated
in the 1990s, whether measured by the L1 or L2 index.
3.2 Correlation Analysis
Table 4 presents the correlation between economic growth and a
wide array of labor regulation indicators for a cross-section of coun-
tries averaged over the 1970–2000 period. In the cross-correlation analy-
sis between growth in per capita GDP and the indicators of labor market
rigidity in the Rama-Artecona database, we find that growth and de
facto rigidities (L0) are negatively correlated for the full sample (–0.12),
with a stronger correlation among developing countries than indus-
trial countries (–0.28 versus –0.12, respectively). The negative correla-
tion between labor regulations and growth is strongest among East
Asian countries (–0.54) and almost negligible in Latin America (–0.001).
The correlation between the L1 index of de facto labor regulations
and economic growth is negative for the world sample (–0.06), as well
as among industrial and developing countries (–0.24 and –0.12, respec-
tively). The L2 index also yields a negative association between labor
regulations and growth. In this case, the correlation is similar for both
industrial and developing countries (fluctuating around 0.33). East Asia
displays the strongest negative correlation (–0.83).
Economic growth is negatively associated with minimum wages
among industrial countries (with a correlation above –0.30), and they
are negatively associated among developing countries when normal-
ized by per capita income (–0.20). The negative correlation between
growth and mandated benefits is weak for the full sample of coun-
tries (–0.05 for social security contributions and –0.12 for maternity
leave).11 A larger share of trade union labor in the total labor force is
associated with lower growth for developing and Latin American coun-
tries (–0.11 and –0.18, respectively). Finally, government employment
has a positive correlation with growth among developing countries
and a negative one among industrial economies and East Asia.
11. If we consider the contribution to social security, the correlation is positive
and small for the group of industrial countries (0.06) and Latin America (0.09).
Maternity leave has a negative correlation with growth for industrial and develop-
ing countries (–0.28 and –0.14, respectively), and a positive but negligible coeffi-
cient for Latin America.All countries Industrial countries Developing countries Chile
Variable 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1970s 1980s 1990s
GDP per capita growth (percent)
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0
Table 3. Basic Statistics for Labor Market Regulations and Economic Growth over the Decadesa















Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003a).
a. Panel data of nonoverlapping five-year-average observations, 1970–2000. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.


























































































































































–0.26186 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
The table also shows the cross-section correlation analysis be-
tween economic growth and the indicators of labor market regula-
tion from the Djankov-La Porta database. These variables describe
the laws protecting workers in three main areas of the labor code:
employment, industrial or collective relations, and social security.
The aggregate index of employment laws is negatively associated
with growth for the world sample (–0.24) and for developing countries
(–0.28), although it is positive for industrial countries (0.16). Within
Full Industrial Developing East Latin
Variable  sample economies countries  Asia America
Labor market rigiditya
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0






Industrial (collective) relations law
Collective bargaining
Worker participation in management
Collective disputes
Social security laws
Old age, disability and death benefits
Sickness and health benefits
Unemployment benefits
Table 4. Cross-section Correlation Analysis between Labor
Regulation and Economic Growth, 1970–2000
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003a).
a. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
c. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified
in the text.
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the group of employment laws, the negative correlation for the full
sample and for developing countries is strongest for conditions of
employment (–0.28) and job security (–0.21).
Industrial relations (collective) laws, in turn, have a small and
negative correlation with growth for the samples of Latin American
and East Asian countries, whereas the correlation is positive for in-
dustrial countries. Laws on collective bargaining and on collective
disputes have a negative correlation among developing areas, with
the strongest correlation displayed for laws on collective bargaining
(–0.25 for developing countries and –0.35 for East Asia). We find a
positive association between growth and the participation of workers
in management.
Finally, social security laws display a positive association with
growth for the samples of Latin American and East Asian countries
and a negative correlation for industrial countries. For the group of
industrial countries, growth is negatively associated with laws con-
templating old age, disability, and death benefits and with sickness
and health benefits (–0.23 and –0.27, respectively), whereas there is
a positive association between growth and unemployment benefits
for the same group of countries (0.13). Developing countries showed
a completely different correlation pattern: positive for old age and
sickness benefits and negative for unemployment benefits.
Table 5 reports the results of our panel correlation analysis be-
tween economic growth and the labor regulation indicators in the
Rama-Artecona database (the only one with a panel dimension). We
present not only the panel correlation for the 1970–2000 period, but
also the evolution of these correlation coefficients over the decades.
In general, we find that de jure rigidities, L0, are negatively corre-
lated with growth for all the samples. The correlation between growth
and de facto rigidities is negative for industrial countries under both
L1 and L2 and negative for developing countries under L2.
We also find that the degree of negative correlation between growth
and L0 (de jure rigidities) increased in the 1990s relative to the 1980s
for industrial countries (from –0.07 to –0.17), whereas it declined for
developing countries over the same time period (from
–0.25 to –0.10). Regarding the aggregate indices of de facto regula-
tion, the negative correlation between L1 and growth decreased from
–0.17 to –0.13 for industrial countries, while it remained constant for
L2 at around –0.28. For developing countries, the correlation between
L1 and growth became negative in the 1990s (–0.10) after being slightly
positive in the 1980s (0.08), and it remained unchanged for L2 over
the same period (–0.27).All countries Industrial countries Developing countries
Labor rigidity indicator Pooled 1970s 1980s 1990s Pooled 1970s 1980s 1990s Pooled 1970s 1980s 1990s
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0





























Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. Panel data for the 1970–2000 period are in five-year nonoverlapping observations. Indicators of labor market rigidity are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
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Correlation Among Indicators of Labor Market Regulation
Here we briefly present the correlations between the different
indicators of labor market regulation used in our regression analysis.
First, we correlate labor indicators within the Rama-Artecona and
Djankov-La Porta databases. We then correlate different indicators
between the two databases. We find that countries with a higher de-
gree of regulation on paper also display a higher degree of regula-
tions in practice. This is reflected in the positive association between
the index L0 and the aggregate indices of de facto rigidities, L1 and L2
(with correlation coefficients of 0.53 and 0.44). On the other hand,
both aggregate indices, L1 and L2, are positively correlated (0.44).
Next, we analyze the correlation between each aggregate index
of de facto regulations and their components. For the L1 index, the
proxies of trade unions and government employment have the high-
est correlation with the aggregate index (approximately 0.78), while
minimum wages has the weakest correlation (0.44). In the case of the
L2 index, the trade union indicator displays the highest correlation
with the aggregate index (0.92), while the correlation of the remain-
ing dimensions fluctuates between 0.30 and 0.34. The proxies used in
each dimension of the aggregate indices, L1 and L2, are positively
correlated, with employment in general and the central government
having a degree of correlation of 0.55. The correlation between mini-
mum wage indicators is 0.35; between measures of mandated ben-
efits, 0.29; and between trade union variables, 0.30.
We also report correlations for the labor regulation measures in
the Djankov-La Porta database. We find that countries with higher
regulation in employment laws also display a larger degree of regula-
tions in industrial relations and social security laws. The positive cor-
relation is strongest between employment laws and industrial relation
laws (0.52) and weakest between employment and social security laws
(0.10). We also find that the components of each aggregate index pro-
posed by the Djankov-La Porta database are highly correlated with
the aggregate index. For example, the aggregate index of social secu-
rity laws is highly correlated with laws on sickness and health ben-
efits (0.84) and unemployment benefits (0.89), while the aggregate
index of employment laws is highly correlated with laws on job secu-
rity (0.81) and employment conditions (0.79).
Finally, we evaluate the correlation of labor regulation indicators
between databases. First, we find that the index of de jure regula-
tions, L0, in the Rama-Artecona database is positively associated with
the aggregate indices in the Djankov-La Porta database. The highest190 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
correlation is displayed between L0 and social security laws (0.46),
while the lowest is between L0 and employment laws (0.16). Analo-
gously, we find that either the L1 and L2 index of aggregate de facto
regulations is positively correlated with the indices in the Djankov-
La Porta data. The highest correlation is again displayed with social
security laws (0.59 with the L1 index and 0.30 with the L2 index).
3.3 Cross-section Regression Analysis
This section discusses the results for the relation between labor
market regulations and economic growth for a cross-section of coun-
tries. Our dependent variable is the annual average growth rate in
GDP per capita over the 1970–2000 period. The explanatory variables
are the log of per capita GDP in 1970, the average years of secondary
schooling in 1970, the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to
GDP, the average annual inflation rate, the degree of openness, the
average annual change in the terms of trade, the real exchange rate
overvaluation, the index of civil liberties (as a proxy for governance),
and our measures of labor regulations. For reasons of space we only
report the coefficient of interest (namely, the labor regulation coeffi-
cient), its standard deviation, the coefficient of determination (R2),
and the number of observations.12
Results for the Rama-Artecona Labor Regulation Indicators
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficient of labor regulation mea-
sures in the Rama-Artecona database and its statistical significance for
the sample of all countries and the samples of developing and indus-
trial countries. We provide both OLS and IV estimations for these co-
efficients.13 The OLS estimates indicate that aggregate measures of
labor regulations—de jure and de facto—are negatively and signifi-
cantly related to growth among industrial countries. The sample of
developing countries, as well as the full sample of countries, yield a
negative association (although statistically negligible) between both
growth and de jure regulations and growth and the L2 index of de facto
regulations. Also, while the R2 coefficient fluctuates between 0.44 and
0.73 for the full sample of countries and for developing countries, it
ranges from 0.82 to 0.91 for the sample of industrial countries.
12. The full regression results are available on request.
13. The coefficient estimates and standard errors of the OLS estimates are
robust to autocorrelation and White heteroskedasticity (following White, 1980).Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 191
Turning to the components of these aggregate indices of de facto
labor regulations, we find the following significant results. First, pub-
lic employment (by either the central or the general government) as
a share of total employment has a positive association with economic
growth for the full sample and for developing countries. On the other
hand, trade unions fully explain the negative and significant correla-
tion between growth and the L2 index for these two samples. Second,
the negative relation between growth and the index of de facto labor
regulations—whether measured by L1 or L2—among industrial coun-
tries is mainly driven by minimum wages and mandated benefits,
proxied by either social security contributions or days of maternity
leave (that is, the economic dimension of labor market regulations,
according to Forteza and Rama, 2002).
For the IV estimates presented in the table, we instrument for
labor market regulations following Djankov and others (2003a), as
mentioned earlier. We find that labor markets are more regulated on
paper (L0) and in practice (L1 and L2) in richer countries and in coun-
tries with left-oriented governments. In contrast, the extent of regu-
lation is lower in countries with common law tradition.14
We find, first, that de jure regulations have a negative impact on
long-run growth for all samples, although it is statistically significant
only for industrial countries. Hence, if regulations in the Spanish
labor code (which was the most highly regulated in the OECD during
the 1995–99 period) were reduced to the average levels (namely, those
exhibited by Greece and Portugal), the country’s growth rate would
increase by 1 percentage point per year. Second, although the L1 and
L2 indices of de facto regulations have a negative relation with growth
in all samples, L1 exerts a negative and significant impact on growth
among developing countries, whereas L2 has a negative impact on
growth among industrial countries.15 Finally, the minimum wage has
a negative and robust relation in the IV estimations regarding the nor-
malization factor and the samples of countries.
Economically speaking, our IV cross-sectional estimates suggest
two key implications. First, if Sweden (the country with the highest
degree of regulation in 1995–99 according to this index) reduced its
labor rigidities to Switzerland’s level (the representative country in
14. For the sake of brevity, we do not report the first-stage regression results;
they are available on request.
15. The negative impact of L1 on growth is mainly attributed to minimum
wages, mandated benefits, and public employment, while the negative impact of
L2 on growth is explained by minimum wages and trade union membership.All countries Industrial countries Developing countries
Estimation method and Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
labor indicator Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs.
Least squaresb
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum waged
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0
Instrumental variablese
De jure index L0
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45All countries Industrial countries Developing countries
Estimation method and Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
labor indicator Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs.
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0




* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003a).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equation (1) in the text, based on an effective sample of seventy-six countries averaged
over the 1970–2000 period. Our control variables are output per capita (in logs), secondary schooling, domestic credit to the private sector, trade openness, governance,
inflation, real exchange rate overvaluation, terms-of-trade shocks, and the labor regulation indicator. Labor regulation data are from Rama and Artecona (2002). Full
regression results and standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space, although they are available from the authors
on request.
b. Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980).
c. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
d. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the text.
e. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic variables, leftist political orientation of the
government, common law tradition, German civil code tradition, and institutionalized autocracy. The set of instruments was chosen from the existing literature, following
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the sample of advanced economies), then its growth rate would in-
crease by 0.7 percentage points per year. Second, if Argentina (the
country with the highest degree of labor regulations in Latin America
in 1995–99) reduced its level of regulations to the regional average,
its growth rate would increase by 1.2 percentage points. If Argentina
reduced its degree of labor regulation to the East Asian average, its
growth rate would increase by 1.6 percentage points.
Results for the Djankov-La Porta Labor Regulation Indicators
Table 7 provides the coefficient estimates for labor regulation indi-
cators in the Djankov-La Porta database, for which we run the same
experiments as in the previous table.16 The least squares estimates of
the labor regulation coefficients for different samples of countries show
that the aggregate index of employment laws has a negative and sig-
nificant relation with growth among industrial countries, which is ex-
plained by laws on employment conditions. The index of social security
laws has a positive and significant relation with growth in the world
sample and the sample of developing countries, although the quantita-
tive relevance of this estimated relation seems to be non significant.
With regard to the estimated IV coefficients for the labor regula-
tion indicators, all three aggregate types of labor laws (namely, em-
ployment, industrial relations, and social security) have a negligible
impact on growth for the world sample and for developing countries.
However, all three aggregate indices have a negative and significant
impact on growth among industrial countries. In the case of employ-
ment laws, for example, we find that if Portugal (the country with the
strictest regulations in 1997) were to reduce its regulations to the level
of Austria (a country with the average level of regulations), its growth
rate would increase by 0.6 percentage points. An analogous decline in
job security (from the countries with the highest levels to the average)
might improve growth by almost 3 percentage points. In the case of
industrial relations laws, Portugal could improve its growth rate by 0.6
percentage points if it reduced its degree of regulation to the average
levels in the region (for example, that of the Netherlands). Finally, if
social security regulations were lessened in Denmark and Sweden (that
is, the countries with the region’s most extensive regulations) to a
16. The full specification is analogous to that used in the cross-section analysis
for the Rama-Artecona database and is available on request.Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 195
level on par with the regional average (for example, Switzerland and
Italy), their growth rate would increase by 0.6 percentage points.
3.4 Panel Data Regression Analysis
We now present the panel data estimates of the relation between
labor market rigidities and economic growth. We use panel data on
seventy-six countries with nonoverlapping five-year-average obser-
vations for the 1970–2000 period. Here, we report three types of esti-
mators: least-squares-based estimators (pooled OLS, least squares
with time effects, and the within-group estimator); instrumental vari-
ables estimators, in which we instrument for labor market regula-
tions following the strategy outlined earlier, both with pooled and
time / country effects IV estimators; and generalized method of mo-
ments estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995),
in which we control for unobserved country and time effects and the
possibility of endogenous regressors and in which we use both inter-
nal instruments (that is, lagged levels of the variables in our regres-
sion framework) and external instruments (that is, exogenous variables
that determine the choice of labor institutions and regulations in the
country). For reasons of space, we only briefly explain the OLS and
IV results and then focus our discussion on the GMM result, which is
our preferred estimation method.
Panel Results from Least-square-based Estimators
Table 8 contains the regression results for the estimated coeffi-
cients of the wide array of labor regulation indicators using different
least-squares-based techniques (namely, pooled OLS, least squares
with time effects, and least squares with country dummy variables)
applied to the full sample, the industrial country sample, and the
developing country sample. Two caveats apply: these estimation tech-
niques do not address the possibility of endogenous regressors, and
taking into account unobserved country effects through country
dummy variables (as in the within-group estimator) in a dynamic panel
data model leads to inconsistent estimates.
Our pooled OLS estimates indicate that both the L0 index of de
jure rigidities and the L2 index of de facto rigidities have a negative
and significant relationship with economic growth. The impact of L1
on growth is negative and significant only for industrial countries. These
results for the indices of de facto regulations hold for the time-effectsAll countries Industrial countries Developing countries
Estimation method and Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
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37All countries Industrial countries Developing countries
Estimation method and Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
labor indicator Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs.
Social security laws
Old age, disability,
   and death benefits






* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003a).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equation (1) in the text, based on an effective sample of seventy-six countries averaged
over the 1970–2000 period. Our control variables are output per capita (in logs), secondary schooling, domestic credit to the private sector, trade openness, governance,
inflation, real exchange rate overvaluation, terms-of-trade shocks, and the labor regulation indicator. Labor regulation data are from Djankov and others (2003a). Full
regression results and standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space, although they are available from the authors
on request.
b. Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity (White, 1980).
c. Our set of instruments for the labor indicators consists of the level of development, trade openness adjusted by geographic variables, leftist political orientation of the
government, common law tradition, German civil code tradition, and institutionalized autocracy. The set of instruments was chosen from the existing literature, following

































37Full sample Industrial countries Developing countries
Estimation method and Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
labor indicator Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs.
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216Full sample Industrial countries Developing countries
Estimation method and Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
labor indicator Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs.
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0
Country-effects estimator
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L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0





















































































































































































* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003a).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equation (1) in the text, based on an effective sample of seventy-six countries averaged
over the 1970–2000 period. The estimation method is least squares. The dependent variable is the growth rate in per capita GDP. Our control variables are output per capita
(in logs), secondary schooling, domestic credit to the private sector, trade openness, governance, inflation, real exchange rate overvaluation, terms-of-trade shocks, and the
labor regulation indicator. Labor regulation data are from Rama and Artecona (2002). Full regression results and standard errors of the coefficients of the labor regulation
variables are not reported for reasons of space, although they are available on request. Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series
heteroskedasticity are reported.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
c. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the text.200 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
estimation. In the case of L2 index, the negative association between
growth and labor regulations among industrial countries is explained
by minimum wages and public employment, whereas it is explained
by trade union membership for developing countries. When we ac-
count for country effects, we find that the aggregate indices of labor
regulations—whether on paper or in practice—have no significant
relation with growth for all samples.17 Here, only the minimum wage
has a negative and significant association with growth among devel-
oping countries, while general government employment has a nega-
tive and significant link with growth regardless of the sample.
Panel Results from Instrumental Variables Estimators
In table 9, we present the coefficient estimates for a large set of labor
market regulation indicators using IV techniques. We performed pooled
IV regressions, IV with time effects, and IV with country effects on the
full sample of countries, as well as on the samples of industrial and de-
veloping countries. Our set of instruments for labor regulation indica-
tors includes per capita output (in logs), trade openness, the government’s
orientation to the left, common law tradition, German civil code tradi-
tion, and institutionalized autocracy. The main results for the first-stage
panel regressions are that rich countries and countries with a left-lean-
ing political orientation have a higher propensity to impose labor rigidi-
ties and regulations than poor or conservative countries. Also, fewer
regulations would be imposed in more open countries, in countries with
common law tradition, and in less autocratic governments.
Our pooled and time-effects IV estimates yield similar qualitative
results. The L0 index of de jure regulations and the L1 index of de facto
regulations have a negative and significant impact on growth for the
full sample of countries and the sample of developing nations, and all
the components of the L1 index have a negative and significant effect
on growth.18 The L2 index of regulations, however, has a negative
17. This estimation is consistent in a dynamic panel data setting model only if
the time dimension is very large (Nickell, 1981). These results should thus be
interpreted very cautiously.
18. Based on our IV estimates with time effects, we find that if regulations in
Mexican labor markets (which have the highest adjusted degree of labor regula-
tions using the L1 index) declined to average Latin American levels (such as those
of Colombia and Paraguay), the country’s growth rate would increase by 1.1 per-
centage points. If labor regulations in Mexico declined to average East Asian
levels, the gains in economic growth would be even higher (approximately 1.8
percentage points). In this latter case, the growth effects of reducing the extent of
regulations are larger for minimum wages (2.4 percentage points) and for public
sector employment (approximately 3.0 percentage points).Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 201
(though insignificant) impact on growth in all samples. Finally, our
country-effects estimates yield an insignificant statistical effect of both
de jure and de facto labor regulations on economic growth, although
the minimum wage remains negative and significant when we ac-
count for country-effects. As mentioned earlier, these results should
be taken with caution since they do not properly account for the pres-
ence of unobserved country-specific effects.
The GMM-IV System Estimator
Having characterized the link between economic growth and la-
bor regulations using some conventional panel data estimation tech-
niques, we now use the GMM-IV system estimator for dynamic panel
data proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). The reasons behind the application of this methodology are
threefold: we need an estimator that deals properly with the dynamic
nature of our model; we need to account for unobserved country-
specific effects within the framework of a dynamic panel data model;
and we need to control for the possibility of endogenous regressors.
One of the advantages of this estimation technique is that we can
compute some specification tests to confirm whether our growth re-
gressions are valid for statistical inference. Further statistical de-
tails on the estimation technique are included in appendix B.
Table 10 presents the regression results of our growth equation
using the GMM-IV system estimator. The main difference with re-
spect to the IV estimator used above is that we use not only the
economic, legal, and political determinants of labor regulations, but
also internal instruments (that is, lagged levels or differences of the
explanatory variables) to account for the endogenous explanatory
variables. Our instruments are valid according to the Sargan test,
and we reject the possibility that the error terms display high-order
serial correlation.19 Among the main results for our control variables
we find evidence of convergence for the full sample of countries. We
also find that growth is enhanced by larger stocks of human capital,
better governance, lower inflation, and real exchange rate overvalu-
ation, as well as positive terms-of-trade shocks. Coefficient estimates
of credit to the private sector and openness either are not robust or
display an unexpected sign (see table 10). In the following paragraphs,
we evaluate the significance of the impact of our variable of interest,
that is, the effect of labor market regulations.
19. By construction, the error process should always exhibit first-order linear
correlation (Arellano and Bover, 1995).Full sample Industrial countries Developing countries
Estimation method and Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
labor indicator Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs.
Pooled estimator
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0
Time-effects estimator
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment

































































































































































































































































































216Full sample Industrial countries Developing countries
Estimation method and Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
labor indicator Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs.
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0
Country-effects estimator
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0
Table 9. (continued)
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002) and Djankov and others (2003a).
a. We report the regression coefficient for the indicator of labor rigidity according to equation (1) in the text, based on an effective sample of seventy-six countries averaged
over the 1970–2000 period. The estimation method is instrumental variables. The dependent variable is the growth rate in per capita GDP. Our control variables are output
per capita (in logs), secondary schooling, domestic credit to the private sector, trade openness, governance, inflation, real exchange rate overvaluation, terms-of-trade shocks,
and the labor regulation indicator. Labor regulation data are from Rama and Artecona (2002). Full regression results and standard errors of the coefficients of the labor
regulation variables are not reported for reasons of space, although they are available on request. Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series
heteroskedasticity are reported.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.




















































































































































































259Full sample Industrial countries Developing countries
Explanatory variable L0 index L1 index L2 index L0 index L1 index L2 index L0 index L1 index L2 index
Constant
Output per capita (logs)
Secondary schooling











Specification test (p value)
Sargan test
Second-order correlation
Table 10. Panel Data Regression Analysis for Labor Market Regulation and Economic Growth:
GMM-IV Estimationsa
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. The dependent variable is the growth rate in per capita GDP. The estimation method is the GMM-IV system estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).
We use the full sample of countries averaged, with nonoverlapping five-year observations over the 1970–2000 period. Labor regulation data are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
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First, the L0 index of de jure regulations has a negative and sig-
nificant relation with economic growth for all samples of countries,
but the impact of deregulation is statistically significant only for the
sample of developing countries. This result implies that a simplifica-
tion of national labor codes may promote growth in developing coun-
tries. For example, if the index of de jure labor regulations for a
representative developing country declined by one standard devia-
tion (0.16), then its growth rate would increase from the regression
sample mean of 1.2 percent to 1.9 percent. Also, if labor market regu-
lations in Argentina (the developing country with the highest value
for L0 in 1995–99) were relaxed to levels exhibited by the average
developing country (say, the Philippines or Honduras), its growth rate
would increase by 0.8 percentage points. Even so, while labor market
deregulation might be effective at reducing de jure regulations, it
might not reduce regulations in practice (Forteza and Rama, 2002).
The coefficient estimate of the L1 index of de facto labor regula-
tions is negative and significant in our regression analysis only for
the sample of industrial countries. Economically speaking, if the rep-
resentative industrial country reduced its degree of labor regulation
by one standard deviation (0.14), its growth rate would increase from
the regression sample mean of 2.0 percent to 4.0 percent. However,
serious efforts to deregulate labor markets in industrial countries
would be required to achieve growth effects of this magnitude.20 For
developed economies, we find that all the components of the L1 index
have a negative coefficient estimate, although one (general govern-
ment employment) is not statistically significant (see table 11). If the
level of market regulations in Sweden, for example, were to decline
to the average level exhibited by the industrial countries, the growth
rate would increase by 0.1 percentage point if the reduction is in
minimum wages and by 0.8 percentage points if the decline is in so-
cial security contributions or trade union membership.
Finally, we find a negative and significant coefficient estimate for
the L2 index of de facto labor regulations regardless of the sample of
countries evaluated. From our coefficient estimates, we find that a
one standard deviation decrease in the index L2 for industrial coun-
tries (0.1) would increase their growth rate by 1.3 percentage points,
whereas an analogous decline for developing countries (0.15) would
raise their growth rate by 0.6 percentage points. The negative impact
20. The level of regulations displayed by the average industrial economy over
the 1990s is similar to that exhibited in the 1970s (see the average of the aggregate
L1 index over decades in table 4).Full sample Industrial countries Developing countries
Std. No. Std. No. Std. No.
Labor indicator Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs. Coeff. dev. R2 obs.
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of  ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0






























































































































































* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from Rama and Artecona (2002).
a. The dependent variable is the growth rate in per capita GDP. The estimation method is the GMM-IV system estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).
We use the full panel data of countries, with nonoverlapping five-year observations over the 1970–2000 period. Labor regulation data are from Rama and Artecona (2002).
Asymptotic standard errors robust to general cross-section and time-series heteroskedasticity are reported.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
c. Minimum wages are normalized with real income per capita. All labor indicators are normalized as specified in the text.Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 207
of a higher degree of labor regulation in industrial economies (as
proxied by higher values of L2) is mainly driven by the negative and
significant growth effects of higher minimum wages and higher gen-
eral government employment (see table 11). The other dimensions
(maternity leave and trade union membership) have no statistically
significant impact. Here, an increase in the growth rate of industrial
countries of 0.3 percentage points would be achieved by a one-stan-
dard-deviation reduction of either. In developing economies, the nega-
tive impact of increased labor market regulations minimum wages
(0.12) or public employment (0.11). on the growth rate may be attrib-
uted to higher minimum wages and larger trade unions. A one-stan-
dard-deviation cut in minimum wages (0.17) may increase the growth
rate of a developing country by 0.5 percentage point, whereas an analo-
gous decline in the role of the trade unions may raise the growth rate
of the economy by 2.0 percentage points (see table 11).
3.5 A Scorecard on the Growth Costs of Labor
Regulations
To assess the growth costs of labor market regulations, we con-
structed a scorecard based on the seven panel estimation techniques
applied to the data. Using our seven different sets of estimated coef-
ficients, we input the value of –1 (+1) to a negative (positive) and
significant coefficient estimate, and 0 to an insignificant coefficient.
Table 12 reports the proportion of negative and positive significant
coefficients.21
We obtain four main stylized facts from our scorecard. First, thicker
labor codes (as proxied by the index of de jure regulations) seem to be
negatively associated with economic growth for both the full sample of
countries and the sample of developing countries. Second, the aggregate
index of de facto labor regulations—whether the L1 or L2 index—has a
weak negative relation with growth for the full sample of countries and
the sample of industrial economies. The L2 index of de facto labor regu-
lations has a negative relation with growth only for the sample of devel-
oping countries. Third, when the minimum wage is expressed as a ratio
of the average labor cost in the manufacturing sector, it has a robust
negative relation with economic growth among industrial countries.
21. A scorecard that assigns a higher value to estimation techniques that give
higher points to econometric techniques that deal with unobserved country and
time effects and endogeneity yields similar results.208 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
When expressed as a ratio of income per capita, it seems to have an
adverse impact on growth regardless of the sample of countries used.
Finally, the rest of the categories—namely, mandated benefits, trade
union membership, and public employment—have a negative but weak
relation with growth for both the world sample and the sample of
developing countries.
Our measures of labor regulation enforcement—measured here
as the difference between de facto and de jure regulations—have a
positive relation with growth. This relation is more robust for the
full sample of countries when we use the L1 index, and for developing
countries when we use the L2 index.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has assessed whether labor market regulations repre-
sent an obstacle for long-term growth. For this analysis, we used two
recently developed databases on labor regulations and outcomes: Rama
and Artecona (2002), which contains data on labor regulations on paper
and in practice for 121 countries and is organized in five-year observa-
tions from 1945–49 to 1995–99; and Djankov and others (2003a), which
analyzes the labor codes for a cross-section of eighty-five countries.
Labor regulation indicator All countries Industrial countries Developing countries
De jure index L0





De facto index L2
Minimum wagec
Maternity leave (no. days)
Ratification of  ILO convention 87
Central government employment
De jure versus de facto
L1 relative to L0
L2 relative to L0














a. Based on seven different panel data estimations, we assigned a value of –1 (+1) to a negative (positive) and
significant coefficient estimate, and 0 to an insignificant coefficient. Here, we report the proportion of negative
and positive significant coefficients.
b. Minimum wages are normalized with the average labor cost in the manufacturing sectors.
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We followed the empirical literature on growth in performing our
regression analysis on two levels. First, we reported the cross-sec-
tional regression results using least squares and instrumental vari-
ables. To instrument for labor regulations, we followed Djankov and
others (2003a) in the selection of our instruments (that is, the level of
development, leftist political orientation of the government, trade
openness, common law tradition, German civil code tradition, and
institutionalized autocracy). Next, we reported the panel data regres-
sion results using three different types of estimators: least-squares-
based estimators, including pooled OLS, least squares with time
effects, and least squares with country dummies (fixed-effects esti-
mator); IV estimators using pooled IV and IV with time- and country-
effects; and the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators
for dynamic panel data models developed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). Here, we
appropriately controlled for the presence of unobserved country ef-
fects in a dynamic panel data model, and we accounted for endog-
enous regressors with both external and internal instruments.
Our main findings are as follows. First, our cross-sectional analy-
sis finds that thicker labor codes (or de jure regulations) have an
adverse impact on long-run growth only among industrial economies.
The impact of de facto regulations—as proxied by L1 and L2—is mixed.
While we find a negative and significant relationship between growth
and the L2 index in industrial countries, we find a negative and sig-
nificant relationship between growth and the L1 index in developing
countries. In addition, we find that all three types of labor laws de-
scribed by Djankov and others (2003a) (namely, employment, indus-
trial relations, and social security) have a significant impact on growth
only among industrial countries.
Second, our GMM-IV system panel data estimates suggest that
less-regulated labor codes may foster growth among developing coun-
tries. Economically speaking, if the L0 index declines by one standard
deviation, the growth rate of a developing country should increase by
0.7 percentage points. One should be very cautious about this result,
however, since simplifying labor codes does not guarantee an im-
provement in the ability to enforce these laws.
Third, the L1 index of de facto rigidities has a negative and signifi-
cant relationship only for industrial economies. Our estimates suggest
that a one-standard-deviation decrease in the L1 index may increase
the growth rate of advanced economies by 2 percent. These growth
effects, however, entail a significant effort to deregulate labor markets210 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
among industrial economies, especially considering that most Euro-
pean countries have made only marginal changes in their labor mar-
ket institutions.
Fourth, a high degree of labor regulation (as proxied by high val-
ues in our L2 index) has an adverse and significant impact on growth
in both industrial and developing countries. We find that a one-stan-
dard-deviation decline in the L2 index developing countries (indus-
trial economies) would increase their growth rate by 0.6 (1.3)
percentage points.
Fifth, the adverse growth effects of labor regulations among de-
veloping countries might be explained by the significant negative
growth effects of minimum wages and trade unions. If minimum wages
were to decline by one standard deviation, the growth rate in devel-
oping countries would increase by 0.5 percentage points; the growth
rate would increase by 2.0 percentage points if an analogous decline
were experienced by the role of trade unions. To achieve these growth
effects, however, developing countries would have to undertake a
very strong effort toward labor market deregulation.
Finally, a scorecard of our panel data estimates suggests that thicker
codes are negatively related to growth for both the full sample of coun-
tries and developing countries. Also, the impact of the aggregate indi-
ces of de facto regulations is negative, but weak. The minimum wage
is the only variable with a robust negative relation with growth.Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 211
APPENDIX A
Sample of Countries
— Industrial countries (twenty-two countries): Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
and United States.
— Latin America and the Caribbean (twenty-one countries): Argen-
tina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
— East Asia and the Pacific (twelve countries): China, Hong Kong, In-
donesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.
— Eastern Europe and Central Asia (seventeen countries): Belarus,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia.
— Middle East and North Africa (twenty-one countries): Algeria,
Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Leba-
non, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.
— South Asia (five countries): Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan,
and Sri Lanka.
— Sub-Saharan Africa (twenty-three countries): Botswana, Burkina
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.212 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
APPENDIX B
Estimation Methodology: The GMM-IV System Estimator
The estimation of a growth regression using a panel data set of
countries across the world poses some challenges.22 First, there are
some unobserved country- and time-specific effects. We can account
for the presence of time effects by including time-specific dummy vari-
ables in our regression, but the common methods used to account for
country effects (that is, within-group estimators) are inappropriate
given the dynamic nature of the regression equation. Second, most
explanatory variables are likely to be jointly endogenous with eco-
nomic growth, and we therefore need to control for the biases result-
ing from simultaneous or reverse causation. The main objective of
this appendix is to outline the econometric methodology we use to
control for country-specific effects and joint endogeneity in a dynamic
model of panel data.
We use the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators
developed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988), Arellano and
Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995) for dynamic models of
panel data. These estimators take advantage of the panel data set;
they are based, first, on differencing regressions or instruments to
control for unobserved effects and, second, on the use of previous
observations of the explanatory variables as instruments (which are
called internal instruments).
After accounting for time-specific effects, we can rewrite equa-
tion (1) as follows:
To eliminate the country-specific effect, we take first-differences
of equation (B.1):
The use of instruments is necessary to deal with the likely
endogeneity of the explanatory variables and the problem that, by
construction, the new error term, εit – εi,t–1, is correlated with the
lagged dependent variable, y i,t–1 – y i,t–2. The instruments consist of
(B.1) ,1  . it i t it i it yy − ′ =α + β +η +ε X
(B.2) () ( ) ( ) ,1 ,1 ,2 ,1 ,1 . i t it it it i t it i t it yy y y −− − − − ′ −= α − + β− + ε − ε XX
22. This appendix draws heavily on Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2003).Are Labor Market Regulations an Obstacle 213
previous observations of the explanatory and lagged dependent vari-
ables. Given that it relies on past values as instruments, this method
only allows current and future values of the explanatory variables to
be affected by the error term. Therefore, while relaxing the common
assumption of strict exogeneity, our instrumental variable method
does not allow the X variables to be fully endogenous.
Under the assumptions that the error term, ε, is not serially
correlated and that the explanatory variables, X, are weakly exog-
enous (that is, the explanatory variables are assumed to be
uncorrelated with future realizations of the error term), the GMM
dynamic panel estimator uses the following moment conditions:
for s ≥ 2; t = 3,…, T. The GMM estimator based on these conditions is
known as the difference estimator. Notwithstanding its advantages with
respect to simpler panel data estimators, the difference estimator has
important statistical shortcomings. Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1996)
and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when the explanatory vari-
ables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these variables are weak
instruments for the regression equation in differences. Instrument
weakness influences the asymptotic and small-sample performance of
the difference estimator. Asymptotically, the variance of the coefficients
rises. Monte Carlo experiments show that the weakness of the instru-
ments can produce biased coefficients in small samples.23
To reduce the potential biases and imprecision associated with the
usual difference estimator, we use a new estimator that combines in a
system the regression in differences with the regression in levels (devel-
oped in Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The instru-
ments for the regression in differences are the same as above. The
instruments for the regression in levels are the lagged differences of the
corresponding variables. These are appropriate instruments under the
following additional assumption: although there may be correlation
23 An additional problem with the simple difference estimator relates to mea-
surement error: differencing may exacerbate the bias as a result of errors in
variables by decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio (see Griliches and Hausman,
1986).
(B.3) () ,1 0a n d it s i t i t Ey−−  ε− ε = 
() −−  ε− ε =  ,1 0, it s i t i t E X (B.4)214 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
between the levels of the right-hand-side variables and the country-
specific effect in equation (B.1), there is no correlation between the dif-
ferences of these variables and the country-specific effect. This
assumption results from the following stationarity property:
for all p and q. The additional moment conditions for the second part
of the system (the regression in levels) are as follows:24
Using the moment conditions presented in equations (B.3), (B.4),
(B.6), and (B.7), we employ a generalized method of moments (GMM)
procedure to generate consistent estimates of the parameters of in-
terest and their asymptotic variance-covariance (Arellano and Bond,
1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995). These are given by the following
formulas:
where θ is the vector of parameters of interest (α , β );     is the depen-
dent variable stacked first in differences and then in levels;      is the
explanatory-variable matrix, including the lagged dependent variable
(yt–1, X) stacked first in differences and then in levels; Z is the matrix
(B.5) () () ,, and it p i it q i Ey Ey ++ η= η
() () ,, , it p i it q i EE ++ η= η XX
24. Given that lagged levels are used as instruments in the differences speci-
fication, only the most recent difference is used as an instrument in the levels
specification. Using other lagged differences would result in redundant moment
conditions (see Arellano and Bover, 1995).
(B.6) () () ,1 ,2 0a n d it it i i t Ey y −−  −η + ε = 
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of instruments derived from the moment conditions; and  is a consistent
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of the moment     conditions.25
The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged
values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth
regression. We address this issue by considering two specification
tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover
(1995). The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which
tests the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample
analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Fail-
ure to reject the null hypothesis gives support to the model. The
second test examines the null hypothesis that the error term, εit, is
not serially correlated. As in the case of the Sargan test, the model
specification is supported when the null hypothesis is not rejected. In
the system specification, we test whether the differenced error term
(that is, the residual of the regression in differences) is second-order
serially correlated. First-order serial correlation of the differenced
error term is expected even if the original error term (in levels) is
uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk. Second-order
serial correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the origi-
nal error term is serially correlated and follows a moving average
process of at least order one. This would reject the appropriateness
of the proposed instruments (and would call for higher-order lags to
be used as instruments).
25. In practice, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the following two-step pro-
cedure to obtain consistent and efficient GMM estimates. First, assume that the
residuals, eit, are independent and homoskedastic both across countries and over
time. This assumption corresponds to a specific weighting matrix that is used to
produce first-step coefficient estimates. Then, construct a consistent estimate of
the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions with the residuals ob-
tained in the first step, and use this matrix to reestimate the parameters of inter-
est (that is, second-step estimates). Asymptotically, the second-step estimates are
superior to the first-step ones insofar as efficiency is concerned.
ˆ Ω216 César Calderón and Alberto Chong
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